‘Faithfulness’ is defined in The Oxford English Dictionary of 1901 in a way that leaves out what one might take as a central paradigm. The OED entry reads, in partFaithfulness … the quality of being faithful.A. Fidelity, loyalty …B. Strict adherence to one's pledged word; honesty, sincerity. …The feudal system, the army, and the rest of such things are provided for in ‘loyalty to a superior …’, and so are friends – after superiors. In, commercial interests are satisfactorily covered: ‘strict (...) adherence to one's pledged word, honesty. …’ It is a nice piece of social history: from William the Conqueror to the latter phases of the Industrial Revolution, in two definitions. But a very odd piece of social history, in that conjugal faithfulness, the most existential one that there is, does not rate a mention. (shrink)

‘Faithfulness’ is defined in The Oxford English Dictionary of 1901 in a way that leaves out what one might take as a central paradigm. The OED entry reads, in partFaithfulness … the quality of being faithful.A. Fidelity, loyalty …B. Strict adherence to one's pledged word; honesty, sincerity. …The feudal system, the army, and the rest of such things are provided for in ‘loyalty to a superior …’, and so are friends – after superiors. In, commercial interests are satisfactorily covered: ‘strict (...) adherence to one's pledged word, honesty. …’ It is a nice piece of social history: from William the Conqueror to the latter phases of the Industrial Revolution, in two definitions. But a very odd piece of social history, in that conjugal faithfulness, the most existential one that there is, does not rate a mention. (shrink)

The differences that lie between Professor Peltz and myself seem, reading his elegant reply, to be more semantic than material. The point which he makes, in §I, that he means by ‘equivocal’ what I, following Aristotle and the tradition, would want to call ‘analogical’, disarms any criticism. For my own part I will go on writing ‘analogical’, but it would be wilful systematically to misunderstand Professor Peltz’ ‘equivocal’, now that it has been explained.

The differences that lie between Professor Peltz and myself seem, reading his elegant reply, to be more semantic than material. The point which he makes, in §I, that he means by ‘equivocal’ what I, following Aristotle and the tradition, would want to call ‘analogical’, disarms any criticism. For my own part I will go on writing ‘analogical’, but it would be wilful systematically to misunderstand Professor Peltz’ ‘equivocal’, now that it has been explained.

Critics of the notion of Necessary Being, and critics of arguments for the existence of God, have often claimed to find flaws in the notion or the arguments, and to find flaws that are due to the presence of concealed tautologies. No theist who recalls the unfortunate of St Anselm and its rejection by St Thomas would dare to claim, his hand on his heart, that tautology has never lurked like a serpent in the garden of natural theology. But the (...) ways in which tautology and talk about God come together on occasion may or may not undermine natural theology in general. I for one am loath to abandon arguments for the existence of God, or give up talk of Necessary Being, since, unlike Professor Findlay, I am unwilling to reverence, much less to worship, a focus imaginarius and I want a real God, or none at all. One of the questions is, of course: does the religious believer want a God who must be too real to be real at all? Another question is: if one can sensibly talk of a God so real as to be Necessary, are there grounds for saying that this possible Necessary Being exists? Between them these questions cover a great part, though by no means all, of the ground of modern discussions on the matter of God. (shrink)

‘Rigour’ is very much a linguistic analyst’s approval word, even, one sometimes gets the feeling, ‘rigour’ as in ‘bored stiff’; Dr Ziff can be very rigorous indeed.

‘Rigour’ is very much a linguistic analyst’s approval word, even, one sometimes gets the feeling, ‘rigour’ as in ‘bored stiff’; Dr Ziff can be very rigorous indeed.

This useful essay, originally published in 1949 and frequently reprinted, is now issued for the first time as a paperback.

‘I enjoy reading Aristotle’ said the don, ‘he’s so dull’ One recalls this anecdote half as a compliment to Professor Sparshott, half as a criticism of his book. The consciously Aristotelian method certainly produces some valuable conceptual analyses, but there is a dryness about the work, and particularly about the first nine sections of it, which might lead the reader whose interests are chiefly literary to doubt whether there is anything at all for him in this stone garden of precise, (...) bare, conceptual analysis. This is a pity, since it is critics and those whose business is to some extent with criticism, rather than mere philosophers, who might benefit from Professor Sparshott’s clarifications. (shrink)